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Executive Summary 
In turbulent times and highly volatile equity and debt markets, the efficient 
management of corporate liquidity suddenly becomes a major focus of corporate 
finance practitioners, sometimes even being critical for a firm’s survival. 
Traditionally, corporate cash levels have been managed close to specific target levels 
and were thought to be rarely influenced by other firm-specific variables. However, 
differences in cash levels across firms can be observed and scientific argumentation 
of what causes these differences is based on two major theories: the transaction cost 
theory, and the financing hierarchy hypothesis. Previous empirical research could not 
yet pinpoint what are the predominant drivers of cash levels and whether there are 
other factors that affect corporate liquidity. Recent studies also began to examine 
corporate governance effects on corporate cash levels. That leads to the research 
question of this thesis: What determinants cause a cross-sectional variation in the 
level of corporate cash holdings and how do national frameworks of corporate 
governance affect the significance of these determinants?  
This thesis applies descriptive statistics and a static panel data model with fixed 
effects estimated by OLS using data samples from German and Swedish companies 
between 2000 and 2008. The explanatory variables used in this study are growth, size, 
ZScore, leverage, debt maturity, cash flow, liquidity, dividends, and opportunity cost. 
As dependent variables two different proxies are used, i.e. Cash1 and Cash2. When 
analyzing the distribution of the two data samples significant differences between the 
countries are found in nearly every explanatory variable, using ordinary mean-
difference tests. However, when it comes to determining differences between Swedish 
and German firms in the panel data model, no clear distinction can be made regarding 
the prevalence of either of the two presented theories. While cash flow to total assets 
is positively related to cash holdings for Swedish firms, thereby suggesting support 
for the financing hierarchy model and possibly a precautionary motive, there is a 
negative sign of the same variable for German firms, which is in line with the trade-
off model. Thus, it can be argued that cross-country effects due to different national 
corporate governance frameworks and levels of investor protection do have a 
significant impact on corporate cash holdings and can be more effective in explaining 
why some companies hold more cash than others.   
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem Background 
Under the pressure of weak equity markets, rising financing costs, liquidity problems 
in all industries, and record-high volatility in all markets, many companies proceed to  
rethink the way a firm’s capital structure is managed. BMW, the German car 
manufacturer, recently stated in a corporate announcement that in 2009 the 
company’s main focus is to increase its position in liquid asset holdings (BMW 
Group, 2009). Regardless of a firm’s profitability, in times of increasing liquidity 
problems, cash management and optimal financial policy-making are critical to a 
firm’s success and, sometimes, survival. The elements of a financial policy must be 
well aligned with each other and their impact must be fully understood in order to 
comprehend the mechanisms of a firm’s key figures and the environment within 
which the company performs.  
“Practitioners tend to make their decisions based on target credit ratings and other 
factors, albeit with modest consideration to financial theory.” (Pettit, 2007, p. 143) 
In scientific literature holding liquid assets has traditionally been justified by 
transaction motives, i.e. to meet the needs associated with running operating 
activities, and precautionary motives, i.e. to meet cash needs during times of cash 
flow shortfalls. The two views are derived from the financial trade-off theory of 
capital structure. The trade-off theory, also referred to as the transaction cost model, 
suggests that costs and benefits of holding cash are considered in determining the 
optimal cash level. There is an incentive to hold cash due to the costs associated with 
rising external financing, e.g. costs of financial distress and agency conflicts. At the 
same time, there are costs associated with holding cash, which is for instance 
demonstrated by the overinvestment problem introduced by Jensen (1986). There is 
also another theory that explains variety in cash holdings. The pecking order theory 
introduced by Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests that there is no optimal level of cash. 
Firms want to avoid the costs of raising external capital, and thus debt decreases and 
cash increases, as the firm has higher cash flows. As a result, the cash level simply 
varies with the profitability of the firm. Opler et al. (1999) study the determinants of 
cash on U.S. firms and find considerable support for the trade-off model. They also 
find evidence of a precautionary motive within firms. The same conclusion is drawn 
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by Kim et al. (1998). Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) examine the influence of firms’ 
corporate governance policies on cash holdings. They introduce board structure and 
ownership variables and find that cash levels increase when managerial ownership is 
between 25% and 64%. In a cross-country analysis, Dittmar et al. (2003) find support 
for the trade-off theory. Moreover, they also find evidence of relationships between 
agency problems and cash holdings. Specifically, they notice that the significance of 
dependency on external financing increases with the level of a country’s investor 
protection.  
The literature on corporate cash holdings has only slowly been developed in recent 
years and the complete picture of the determinants on cash holdings has yet to be 
found. The recent studies of Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and Dittmar et al. (2003) are 
steps in the right direction and provide interesting hypotheses that can be further built 
upon. However, it seems as though more empirical evidence has to be found in order 
to reach a consensus on the issue. For instance, how are cash holdings determined in 
other European markets? Are there systematic differences in the determinants 
between markets and, if so, how might these differences be explained? The study of 
Dittmar et al. (2003) provides a starting point. However, the notions provided in this 
study need to be extended in a more detailed manner. 
1.2 Purpose and Contribution 
Despite some recent studies conducted on corporate cash holdings, most of the 
empirical work done focuses on the US market. Since the Anglo-American regulatory 
approach is quite different from both the German and the Swedish systems, empirical 
findings on one market cannot simply be applied to other markets. By applying a 
detailed empirical study to two distinct countries, different corporate governance 
approaches and their impact on cash holdings can be analyzed. Moreover, by looking 
at firm-specific variables this study employs different financial theories in order to 
test which approach is more significant in determining the amount of cash held by a 
company. The underlying research questions are: What are the determinants, both 
firm-specific and on a regulatory level, that drive firms to hold a certain amount of 
cash on their balance sheet? Furthermore, is there a difference between Swedish and 
German companies? 
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In addition to being the first study that examines the Swedish market and puts it into 
the wider context of the largest European economy, this study also contributes to the 
corporate finance literature in two other ways. Firstly, it provides empirical insight 
into which financial theory dominates the decision-making process of corporate 
financial managers. Secondly, this thesis can be a helpful instrument for financial 
officers, as well as active shareholders, to understand the mechanisms and drivers of 
cash holdings in order to manage and govern a firm’s assets more efficiently.  
1.3 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 highlights the underlying financial theory and the characteristics of the two 
distinct markets, i.e. Sweden and Germany. Special emphasis lies on the trade-off 
theory, which includes the transaction cost model and the agency theory, the financial 
hierarchy model, and corporate governance issues in the two respective countries. 
Finally, an empirical literature review is presented to pinpoint the recent 
developments in empirical findings on cash holdings and their relation to the theories 
used in this thesis. 
Chapter 3 presents the data sample and variables used in this analysis. A detailed 
description of each variable used is given, in addition to an explanation regarding the 
applicability of the chosen variables to this study. This should provide a deeper 
insight into how the empirical model is created so that future studies can replicate the 
used framework more easily. 
Chapter 4 introduces the methodology used in this thesis. Since the data sample 
includes multiple periods, a static panel data study is used to provide further insight 
into the mechanisms of corporate cash holdings. For this reason, the features of panel 
data are presented first, followed by the methodology of estimating regressions using 
panel data (including fixed effects). 
Chapter 5 presents the empirical findings of the models used in this study. It starts 
with a presentation of the results of descriptive statistics in order to give the reader an 
impression of the dynamics of the two distinct data samples. In the second part the 
results from the panel data analysis are presented and discussed. Each explanatory 
variable is explained and put into the theoretical context as well as compared to other 
studies individually. 
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Chapter 6 draws a final conclusion on the empirical results of this study. This chapter 
stresses the managerial implications in the area of cash holdings for different firm 
characteristics and under different regulatory environments. Finally, suggestions for 
further research are provided.  
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2. Theoretical Framework 
The following chapter introduces the underlying financial theory that is commonly 
used to explain the costs and benefits of holding cash on a balance sheet. After a brief 
introduction to the theory of the irrelevance of capital structure under perfect 
assumptions, the two dominating financial theories are presented, i.e. the trade-off 
theory and the financing hierarchy theory. Furthermore, the German and Swedish 
markets are presented and differences in regulation, investor protection, and 
corporate governance standards are highlighted. Finally, a brief summary of relevant 
empirical literature in the field of corporate cash holdings research is presented to 
impart the significance of this study and why this thesis is another step in explaining 
why companies hold different amounts of cash on their balance sheets. 
2.1 Introduction 
If market imperfections did not exist, financial policies would have no effect on the 
valuation of a firm (Stiglitz, 1974). However, this hypothesis only holds under strong 
assumptions, while in reality financial managers put great efforts into managing 
companies at an optimal capital structure. The quest for optimal capital structure is 
expanding to include items other than just debt and equity. In a world of rising capital 
costs and the related importance of opportunity cost of having excess cash, liquid 
assets have become a key focus on a company’s balance sheet in the optimal capital 
allocation problem (Pettit, 2007). In reality, similar companies with significantly 
different cash levels can be observed, indicating that optimal cash holdings are 
dependent on various factors. However, corporate finance practitioners tend to make 
their decisions regarding financial policy and capital structure based on targeted credit 
ratings and other similar factors, with only little focus on financial theory (Pettit, 
2007). In this chapter, the main theories on capital structure and the role of cash are 
presented, i.e. the trade off theory (transaction cost motive and agency problems) and 
the financing hierarchy theory. Moreover, we present macro factors that can have an 
impact on a company’s balance sheet and thus lead to different cash allocations in 
different markets. Here the focus lies on differences between Swedish and German 
regulations. Furthermore, the characteristics of firms that were found to be 
empirically relevant to the level of cash holdings in previous studies are introduced.  
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2.2 Cash in a Frictionless World 
In a frictionless world, keeping liquid financial assets is irrelevant to the firm’s value. 
Such an environment is often described as ideal capital market or perfect capital 
market. In such a world of perfect capital markets, holdings of cash and cash 
equivalents are irrelevant, any amount of cash needed to invest in projects with a 
positive net present value (NPV) or to balance temporary cash shortfalls could be 
obtained without hindrance and at a reasonable price (Garcia-Teruel & Martinez-
Solano, 2008). Since there is no liquidity premium, holdings of cash have no 
opportunity cost and shareholder wealth, i.e. the market value of the company, 
remains unchanged in spite of changing cash holdings (Opler, Pinkowitz, & Stulz, 
1999). This environment is characterized by a set of five assumptions, which restrict 
behaviour on security trading and the scope of a firm’s investment and financing 
decisions (Odgen, Jen, & O'Connor, 2003). These assumptions describe complete and 
perfect capital markets. Based on these assumptions, Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
developed the groundbreaking theory that the market value of a firm remains constant 
regardless of the capital structure (M&M Proposition I), and that the expected return 
on a firm’s equity is an increasing function of the firm’s leverage due to the addition 
of equity risk (M&M Proposition II) (Modigliani & Miller, 1958): 
M&M Proposition I:   
 
M&M Proposition II: 
  
 
Figure 1: Assumptions for Perfect Capital Market (Odgen et al., 2004) 
1. Frictionless Capital Markets 
• No transaction costs & taxes. No trading restrictions (e.g. on short selling), no costs on issuing or retiring securities. No cost of 
financial distress. Equal borrowing costs of firms and individuals 
2. Homogenous Expectations 
• All relevant information is instantly and costlessly available to all participants. Rational behaviour.  
3. Atomistic Participants 
• No single participant can influence market price of securities via trade 
4. Disclosure of Company's Investment Program 
• All assets, operations, strategies are fixed and known by all investors 
5. Fixed Capital Structure 
• Once chosen, the company's capital structure is fixed 
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The assumptions underlying the Modigliani Miller theorem are rather strong and are 
in reality never fulfilled. Hence, the important implication of this theorem lies in the 
violation of the assumptions and the conclusion that when such a violation takes place 
the capital structure of a firm does indeed have an impact on the firm value. Kraus 
and Litzenberger (1973) have shown that when, for instance, including tax in the MM 
theorem, the optimal capital structure of a firm changes significantly towards a higher 
leverage. However, with increasing leverage, the marginal advantages of debt 
simultaneously decrease. The optimum changes again when penalty costs related to 
bankruptcy are added. Thus, we can define the optimal capital structure of a firm as a 
trade-off between costs and benefits of debt, equity, and financial distress. Thinking 
one step further, optimal cash holdings are also a trade-off between costs and benefits 
of holding liquid assets on a firm’s balance sheet. 
2.3 The Trade-Off Theory 
2.3.1 The Transaction Costs Model 
If it is costly for a company to be short of cash or other liquid assets there is 
automatically an optimal level of cash holdings that maximizes the company value. In 
optimum, the marginal cost of holding liquid assets equals the marginal benefits of 
holding those assets. The marginal benefits can also be described as the marginal cost 
of liquid asset shortage. Simultaneously, financial managers have to address the 
question of why it is more beneficial to hold an additional unit of liquid assets instead 
of cutting back on cash holdings (Opler, Pinkowitz, & Stulz, 1999). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Optimal Level of Cash Holdings (Opler et al., 1999) 
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Initially introduced by Keynes in 1936, the transaction motive for holding liquid 
assets originates from the costs related to converting non-cash assets into cash. 
Raising liquid funds by selling assets, issuing new debt or equity, or cutting back on 
dividends involves costs that have both fixed and variable components. If it is further 
assumed that liquidating non-cash assets is related to significant costs higher than 
raising capital externally, firms prefer using capital markets to liquidate assets tied in 
operational activities. However, the fixed portion of the transaction cost makes the 
company raise external funds infrequently and holding cash and cash equivalents 
becomes a buffer that is valuable to the firm (Opler, Pinkowitz, & Stulz, 1999). 
Furthermore, working capital, such as inventory and accounts receivable, can be seen 
as cash substitutes that can be easily transformed into cash when needed. Companies 
with a larger amount of working capital can be expected to hold less cash since a 
transformation is relatively cheap and easy. This is called the substitution effect of 
working capital (Koller & Goedhart, 2005). Accordingly, it can be expected that 
companies that face higher transaction costs, i.e. firms with assets that cannot be 
converted into liquid assets easily and as a result have a higher marginal benefit of 
cash, will hold greater amounts of cash on their balance sheet (Ozkan & Ozkan, 
2004).  
“Cash provides an important buffer against operating volatility and unexpected cash 
flow shortfalls, to lower the probability of financial distress and to ensure self-
sufficiency and the ability to invest in growth through difficult quarters. Excess cash 
balances may be used as a buffer against uninsurable shortfalls.” (Pettit, 2007) 
It is empirically shown that the probability of financial distress increases ceteris 
paribus with the level of growth opportunities due to the intangible and uncertain 
nature of future growth (Shleifer & Vishny, 1992; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). Moreover, 
cash holdings can also be described as dry powder, i.e. growth capital for future 
expansion and prospects (Pettit, 2007). Hence, the marginal benefit of cash holdings 
and the related financial flexibility, i.e. the marginal costs of liquidity shortage, 
increases alongside a firm’s growth opportunities. In times of cash shortage, a firm 
with strong profitable investment opportunities would have to give up higher valued 
projects than others. In other words, a suboptimal capital structure can lead to 
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suboptimal investment strategies that do not maximize firm value but instead only 
benefit particular stakeholders. Holding cash for these reasons is generally referred to 
as precautionary motives (Han & Qiu, 2007). In total, Opler et al. (1999) pinpoint 
seven firm-specific variables that affect marginal costs and benefits of being short of 
liquid funds: 
 
Figure 3: Transaction Cost Model Variables (Opler et al., 1999) 
2.3.2 Agency Problems 
The incentive to maximize equity value is not always in line with the incentive to 
maximize the firm value (La Rocca, Cariola, & La Rocca, 2008). Thus, a suboptimal 
level of cash holdings eventually leads to conflicts between managers, shareholders, 
and creditors. In particular, there are two categories of agency problems, i.e. the 
principal agent problem between owners and managers and the agency problem 
between managers and creditors. Related to investment strategies, the problems can 
be categorized into overinvestment and underinvestment problems.  
Overinvestment problems  
Overinvestment problems appear in various forms. The most common form is that 
managers tend to set investment strategies above the optimal level to grow beyond the 
optimal firm size since growth increases managers’ power by increasing the resources 
under control (Jensen, 1986). This is often referred to as empire building. Murphy 
(1985) also finds empirical evidence for the relationship between managerial 
compensation and sales growth, supporting managers’ tendency to increase firm size 
1. Access to capital markets 
•  Lower cost for companies with easy or already existing access to capital markets or credit lines 
2. Cost of raising funds through asset sales, dividend cuts, and renegotiation 
•  Type of assets (e.g. serving as collateral), dividend cuts can be used as financing source 
3. Investment Opportunities 
•  Growth opportunities with positive NPV 
4. Cost of hedging instruments 
•  Risk management as substitute for holding cash 
5. Cash conversion cycle 
•  Amount of product lines, inventory management, lean production 
6. Cash flow volatility 
•  Higher risk of shortage increases associated costs 
7. Economies of scale in cash management 
•  Cash management can or cannot have scale economies with impact on marginal benefits 
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beyond optimal levels. Jensen (1986) relates this agency problem to free cash flow, 
which he defines as excess cash flow of projects with a positive NPV. However, since 
excess liquidity is simply cumulated historical free cash flow, the two variables are 
interrelated. According to La Rocca et al. (2008), other sources of overinvestment lie 
in managerial overconfidence and management entrenchment. In all three cases, the 
addition of debt or paying out cash as dividends can reduce overinvestment problems. 
Paying interest and/or dividends reduces the amount of cash managers have at hand.1 
Thus, leverage and dividends are important tools in reducing agency problems related 
to cash holdings between shareholders and managers. 
Underinvestment problems 
Underinvestment problems are also called debt-overhang problems and are related to 
agency problems between shareholders and debtholders. Assuming that a firm’s 
managers are agents of the shareholders, they also tend to act in the owners interest 
rather than in favour of creditors. In the presence of so-called risky debt, i.e. debt 
whose market value differs from the nominal value, managers tend to make 
suboptimal decisions by rejecting investment opportunities with a positive net present 
value that would mostly benefit the holders of risky debt2 (La Rocca, Cariola, & La 
Rocca, 2008). However, from an ex-post perspective this suboptimal decision-
making, i.e. underinvestment problems, can lead to lost growth opportunities and 
eventually lower equity value (Myers, 1977). To reduce potential risk-shifting, 
debtholders often add covenants to their given credit. Covenants can limit a firm’s 
ability to raise additional debt or might require a minimum amount of liquidity held. 
If no covenants can be applied, creditors may ex-ante raise interest rates as a premium 
to take possible underinvestment problems into account.  
The connection between capital structure and investment strategies creates a situation 
where strong or weak cash holdings can affect a firm’s ability to make optimal use of 
growth opportunities that may arise. It has also been shown that a suboptimal capital 
structure can be caused by agency problems between shareholders, managers, and 
creditors. An important factor, that also influences agency problems and consequently 
                                                
1 If cash holdings are seen as negative debt as in Opler et al. (1999), the addition of debt is equal to a 
reduction of cash holdings. Also see John, T. A. (1993). Accounting Measures of Corporate Liquidity, 
Leverage and Costs of Financial Distress. Journal of Financial Management , 22, 91-100. 
2 According to La Rocca et al. (2008) this is the case when the NPV of an investment opportunity is 
positive but smaller than the nominal value of the firm’s risky debt. 
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the capital structure, is the debt structure, i.e. different maturity and seniority classes 
and a firm’s growth opportunities. 
2.4 The Financing Hierarchy Model 
The financing hierarchy model was first developed by Donaldson (1961) and then 
extended by Myers & Majluf (1984) who set the model in the context of rational 
expectations. This model presents a different way of looking at investment decisions 
by considering how the investment is financed. According to Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) the firm should evaluate the investment opportunity as though it already had 
the funds to finance it. This view rests on the assumption that capital markets are 
efficient, i.e. that securities can always be sold at a fair price and thus, the decision-
rule is to undertake every investment with a positive net present value. However, it is 
reasonable to assume that managers often have better information than investors with 
regards to the investment opportunity set and therefore, due to this information 
asymmetry, there are costs embedded into every issue of new securities.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that firms tend to follow a hierarchy of financial 
policies when faced with decisions to invest. This financing hierarchy, which is based 
on the information asymmetry problem, is also referred to as the pecking order 
hypothesis: 
1. Firms prefer to finance investments through the use of internally generated 
funds rather than externally raised capital. 
2. Due to “sticky” dividends, cutting dividends is not used as means to finance 
investments, i.e. changes in net cash will show up as changes in external 
financing. 
3. If external capital is needed, the firm will always prefer the safest security 
among the alternatives available to the firm, i.e. work down the pecking order 
starting with debt. Rather than repurchasing equity, the firm will pay down 
debt if the internally generated cash flow is greater than capital expenditures  
4. The leverage of the firm will thus reflect the cumulative need for future 
external financing. 
Managers often justify not issuing equity by arguing that it is not appropriate to issue 
when the firm is undervalued. The logical solution to eliminate some of the 
information asymmetry costs would be to only issue stock when the firm is 
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overvalued. But, as the firm wants to take advantage of every positive net present 
value project while simultaneously avoiding raising funds at an unfavourable price, 
financial slack is needed. If the firm has large enough cash holdings and investors 
know that issuing equity is not needed in order for the firm to invest, an issue would 
send a strong negative signal to investors. Debt also contains information asymmetry 
costs, although these are less severe than in the case of equity. As Myers (2001) 
argues, debt is a more senior claim compared to equity, and debtholders are therefore 
less exposed to errors in the valuation of the firm. Moreover, the information 
advantage that managers have is reduced when debt is issued. A debt issue reveals to 
investors that the firm considers debt to be a cheaper alternative over equity and thus 
signals a certain level of firm value. Optimistic managers will therefore prefer to issue 
debt over equity. Only pessimistic managers, who believe that their firm is 
overvalued, will consider equity as their best alternative. However, equity will be 
issued, even for firms with optimistic managers, when the firm is worried about the 
substantial costs of financial distress, which consequently makes debt too costly. To 
conclude, financial slack circumvents the costs associated with external financing. 
The pecking order model puts forward a motive for holding cash since external 
financing should be avoided. The main difference from the trade-off model is that in 
this case the cost of external finance plays a larger role. With this view, there is no 
optimal level of cash holdings since it is assumed that there is no optimal level of net 
debt. Cash balances are simply the outcome of the financing decisions as suggested 
by Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order model. If the firm does not have funds 
that satisfy its investment needs, the firm will raise debt. When resources are 
sufficient and exceed the amount required for investments, the firm will pay 
dividends, pay debt when it becomes due, and will otherwise accumulate cash 
(Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, & Servaes, 2003; Opler, Pinkowitz, & Stulz, 1999). 
2.5 Investor Protection, Corporate Governance and Financial 
Markets 
It is well known that the size and structure of capital markets vary a great deal across 
countries. Why is it that the UK and US have relatively large equity markets while 
France and Germany have much smaller ones? Why do Germany and Japan have 
much more extensive banking systems in comparison to other developed economies? 
It turns out, as argued by La Porta et al. (1998), that a fair amount of the differences in 
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the structure and effectiveness of financial systems among countries can be traced 
back to the respective legal protection of investors’ interests as reflected in the 
countries’ judicial systems. This is because the ability of a firm to raise external 
financing depends to a great extent on which terms can be obtained. Thus, an 
effective legal environment protects investors against expropriation by managers, 
increases the likelihood that an investor will provide financing, and hence increases 
the scope of capital markets.  
“For academia and experts in corporate governance, we suggest that the inclusion of 
the legal and institutional setting could significantly improve the validity of the 
research.” (Lopez-de-Foronda, Lopez-Iturriage, & Santamaria-Mariscal, 2007, p. 
1131) 
There are two main legal systems in the world; common law, made by rulings 
incorporated into legislature, and civil law, which dates back to Roman law and is 
part of a scholar and legislator-made tradition. La Porta et al. (1998) conclude that 
English common law provides the best investor protection while the worst protection 
for investors is found in countries with French civil law. Countries using 
Scandinavian civil law and German civil law fall somewhere in between. 
2.5.1 Germany vs. Sweden 
Shareholder rights 
La Porta et al. (1998) analyze countries’ respective shareholder protection by 
investigating a number of variables. Germany and Sweden have many similarities in 
their protection of shareholder interests but also a few differences. Neither of the two 
countries have the one share, one vote principle. This means that non-voting shares, 
low- and high-voting shares, founders’ shares with high-voting shares, and shares 
whose voting rights increase with the time of holding are allowed. Neither country 
allows for proxy votes to be mailed, which means that some shareholders have 
difficulties exercising their votes. Neither cumulative voting for directors nor 
proportional voting, i.e. that minority shareholders are given the power to put their 
representatives on the board of directors, is allowed. Furthermore, minority 
shareholders are given no legal mechanisms against perceived oppression of directors, 
which, if there were such mechanisms, could include the right to challenge directors’ 
decision in court. However, Sweden, in contrary to Germany, grants shareholders pre-
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emptive rights to buy new issues of stock, which protect existing shareholders from 
dilution. Moreover, German law requires that shareholders’ shares are deposited 
within the company or a financial intermediary several days prior and after a 
shareholder meeting. This mechanism prevents investors from trading the shares 
during this time. Thus, shareholders in Sweden are more protected by law than 
shareholders in Germany. It is common among all major economies to include a 
requirement of having a certain percentage of share capital in order to be able to call 
an extraordinary shareholder meeting. In Sweden and Germany this percentage is set 
to 10 percent and 5 percent, respectively. 
Creditor rights 
An evaluation with regards to whether creditors are better off with certain rules and 
regulations is more ambiguous than an evaluation of shareholder rights. Firstly, it is 
more challenging to satisfy many different creditors’ interests at once due to 
subordination of credits and the resulting different credit tranches. Secondly, a 
country that gives limited rights with respect to the liquidation procedure of a 
defaulting firm but has a perfect reorganisation process does not necessarily mean that 
creditor rights are compromised. In this case, the creditors may still have some power 
in the form of votes in the decision of how to reorganise the firm.  
As with shareholder rights, there are some similarities between creditor rights in 
Germany and Sweden. Both countries preclude management from unilaterally seeking 
court protection against creditors when filing for reorganisation without creditors’ 
consent. Moreover, the right that secured creditors are paid first in case of liquidation 
applies to both Sweden and Germany. Yet another similarity is that there is no 
dismissal of managers during a reorganisation procedure. Sweden, however, has a 
slightly weaker overall protection of creditors due to the fact that creditors cannot 
repossess collateral assets from the firm in the case of a reorganisation procedure. La 
Porta et al. (1998) argue that Germany has very good creditor protection by 
recognising this issue. Although Germany does allow managers to remain on duty 
during a reorganisation, creditors here are less dependent on reorganisation 
procedures of distressed firms because liquidation is made easier. Thus, having strong 
creditor rights when it comes to the reorganisation procedure does not serve much 
purpose. 
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Discussion 
Indeed, as could be expected, the differences in shareholder and creditor rights affect 
the level of development of debt and equity markets. La Porta et al. (1997) show that 
there is a positive relationship between countries with German civil law and their ratio 
of debt to GNP. However, this finding is not statistically significant. Surprisingly, 
Scandinavian origin countries have a much lower ratio of debt to GNP. The aggregate 
debt as a share of GNP is 97% for countries with German civil law and 54% for 
countries with Scandinavian civil law. However, Krishnan and Moyer (1996) study 
the capital structure determinants of large corporations and find that German firms 
generally have lower leverage than firms from the US, but  make greater use of short-
term debt, which is consistent with the idea that firms in Germany have close 
relationships with banks. Furthermore, as noted by La Porta et al. (1998), Germany 
has a relatively high degree of ownership concentration: the three largest shareholders 
own 48 percent on average. Ownership concentration in Sweden is significantly lower 
with 28 percent on average. This supports the notion that a higher ownership 
concentration is a consequence of easier bank borrowing which in turn leads to firms 
financing investments with debt rather than equity. 
2.6 Empirical Literature Review 
Kim et al. (1998) were the first to deliver empirical results for the trade-off theory and 
corporate cash holdings. In their empirical analysis of 915 US industrial firms with 
data from 1975 until 1994, the researchers look at both the costs and benefits of 
holding liquid assets by doing both cross-sectional regressions and pooled time-series 
cross-sectional regressions. They find that firms with more volatile earnings face 
higher external financing costs and, as a result, hold a higher amount of liquid assets 
relative to the firms’ total assets. Firms with higher growth opportunities, measured 
by market-to-book ratios, have also got significantly larger cash positions. Moreover, 
firm size seems to be negatively related to cash holdings, although findings are not 
always significant. Since access to capital markets is positively related to firm size 
these findings are consistent with the transaction cost model. Another strong finding 
is the relation between cash and potential investment opportunities in the future. Here 
the authors find a positive relationship between cash and measures of future economic 
conditions, where the logarithmic growth rate of the index of leading economic 
indicators is used as proxy (Kim, Mauer, & Sherman, 1998).  
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Opler et al. did another essential study on cash holdings in 1999, where the theoretical 
assumptions of the financing hierarchy model were added and compared to the 
transaction cost theory. Using a sample size of at least 1048 US firms and an 
extensive time frame from 1971 to 1994, the researchers look at how firms change 
their cash holdings over time with respect to firm size, growth opportunities, cash 
flow volatility, capital expenditures, M&A activity, and dividends. In a single-period 
cross sectional regression the authors also include a credit quality measure in the form 
of Altman’s Z-Score. As anticipated, firms with a higher credit quality tend to hold 
fewer liquid assets. Moreover, the other empirical findings on the determinants of 
cash holdings are consistent with Kim et al. (1998) and support the trade-off model. 
They also find that increases in excess cash holdings rarely lead to a proportional 
increase in capital expenditures, acquisitions, and dividend payouts. Firms that 
experience such an increase tend to retain excess cash, supporting management’s 
tendency to accumulate cash beyond optimal levels. However, Opler et al. (1999) do 
not find a significant connection between liquid asset holdings and the used proxies 
for agency costs and therefore make a suggestion for further research in this area. 
In a more recent study, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) firstly examine the empirical 
determinants of cash holdings for firms in the UK over the period 1984-1999 using a 
dynamic panel data regression and a generalized method of moments (GMM) to 
estimate the coefficients. The authors’ reasons for this decision pertain to the potential 
delays in the capital structure adjustment process to the target cash structure, and they 
finally find evidence for dynamic effects in the determination of cash holdings. 
Although being closer to the US than to other European markets, the UK has distinct 
corporate governance features, which add further importance to this study. By 
including managerial ownership variables as well as board structure variables, which 
measure the ratio of executive and non-executive board members, the authors show 
that there is a significant relationship between a firm’s corporate governance policy 
and its level of cash holdings. By using a non-linear model they show that the 
connection of managerial ownership and cash holdings is non-monotonic, with cash 
holdings falling as managerial ownership increases up to 24%, increasing cash levels 
up to 64%, and again decreasing cash holdings for managerial ownership greater than 
64%. However, the authors fail to deliver an explanation of why managers would 
change their cash policy again at high levels of ownership (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). 
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Compared to Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), other studies that focus on managerial 
ownership and US firms found no or only little evidence for a significant impact on 
cash levels. A possible reason for this difference is that shareholders in the US enjoy 
good protection (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, & Servaes, 2003; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002). 
Most of the studies that have examined the financing hierarchy theory have used 
samples of US firms. In a recent cross-country study, Seifert and Gonenc (2008) 
attempt to ascertain how well pecking order behaviour applies to companies in the 
US, the UK, Germany, and Japan. Whereas the researchers find only no or only little 
significant evidence for pecking order behaviour for the first three countries, the 
evidence is favourable for Japanese firms. From these results one can conclude that a 
country’s regulatory system can influence the impact of financial theory on firms’ 
capital structure. 
Thus, with respect to international corporate governance and corporate cash holdings, 
Dittmar et al. (2003) deliver interesting empirical findings. For a single-year sample 
of more than 11,000 companies from 45 countries, the researchers find a significant 
negative connection between regulatory shareholder protection and firms’ cash 
holdings. Moreover, the importance of other, more traditional factors, e.g. agency 
problems, growth opportunities etc., decreases with lower shareholder protection. 
They also find empirical support for the trade-off theory and the positive correlation 
of growth and cash holdings. Moreover, they argue for a substitution effect of 
working capital and cash. When it comes to access to capital markets, Dittmar et al. 
(2003) find decreasing significance with regards to dependence on external finance 
variables when shareholder protection is low. This finding contradicts the transaction 
cost motive since external financing costs are expected to increase with poor investor 
protection. However, a weakening significance is then a further indicator of agency 
motive for corporate cash holdings (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, & Servaes, 2003).  
In a study of SME cash holdings in Spain, Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008) 
find empirical evidence for the fact that companies have a certain target level of cash 
holdings, which they attempt to converge. In their study of 860 small and medium-
sized manufacturing firms over 6 years (1996-2001), the researchers apply a dynamic 
panel study and the GMM estimation technique to capture converging effects which 
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are found to be higher for SMEs than for larger firms. The authors argue that the 
quicker conversion to target levels is caused by higher information asymmetries and 
agency problems for smaller firms and related higher costs when deviating from the 
optimal cash level. Although only little evidence for the impact of leverage on cash 
holdings is found, the authors find a significant relationship between debt maturity 
structure and cash holdings. Firms with a high short-term debt ratio tend to hold more 
liquid assets. Here the authors argue that firms with short-term debt are likely to have 
greater information asymmetry (Garcia-Teruel & Martinez-Solano, 2008). 
As it can be seen, there are several competing variables when it comes to cash 
holdings. Varying approaches in financial theory lead to different expected signs of 
the coefficients. As more recent studies have shown, a country’s regulatory 
environment has a strong impact on the level of cash held by a firm and on its capital 
structure (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004). However, there has been no study conducted so 
far that focuses on a detailed cross-country comparison between only two countries to 
pinpoint potential specific differences in a regulatory framework and their impact on 
cash holdings. Moreover, there are only very few studies conducted within the 
European Union, with none of them focusing on Germany or Sweden. 
 19 
3. Data and Variables 
This chapter introduces the data and variables used in this empirical study. This is of 
particular importance when attempting to replicate this study to apply it to countries 
other than Germany or Sweden. Firstly, the acquisition of data and its sources are 
described. Secondly, the variables that are used in the descriptive statistics and the 
empirical model are presented. For each variable the expected direction of the impact 
is given according to the underlying theory. 
3.1 Data Sample 
To investigate the research questions, firm specific data from the Thomson 
Datastream database for Swedish and German firms between the years 2000 and 
2008 has been collected. Data from 174 Swedish firms and 546 German firms has 
been obtained, comprising a total of 1,017 and 2,795 observations for the Swedish 
and German markets, respectively. In order to determine the nationality of firms the 
country name is used as search criteria under the search option “Market” and any firm 
that does not have their primary listing in either Sweden or Germany is excluded. 
Moreover, banks and financial firms are excluded with the help of the industry 
categorisation used by Thomson Datastream. This is done because marketable 
securities and cash are part of these firms’ business and because of their need to meet 
specific regulatory capital requirements (Opler, Pinkowitz, & Stulz, 1999). Finally, 
monthly data on interest rates during the period 2000-2008 has been collected for 
Sweden from the Thomson Datastream database. Monthly interest rates for German 
treasury bills (Bubills) have been obtained from the European Central Bank3. The 
translation of interest rates into annual rates is conducted by taking the yearly average 
of the monthly observations.  
In line with the study by Dittmar et al. (2003), the bottom and top one percent of the 
observations of all variables are eliminated to remove potentially disturbing outlier 
effects. Thus, the number of observations is reduced to 825 and 2,458 for the Swedish 
and German markets, respectively. When first differences of the variables are 
specified in the later sections, the data sample is further reduced since year 2000 
observations then are excluded from the data sample. 
                                                
3 http://www.ecb.int/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html 
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3.2 Variables 
The choice of variables that could have an impact on corporate cash holdings and are 
therefore used in this empirical study are based on variables included in previous 
scientific studies that are discussed in chapter 2.6. Furthermore, motivations of why 
and how these variables should correlate with cash holdings are given in the following 
section.  
The dependent variable in this thesis, cash, can be measured in different ways. Opler 
et al. (1999) use cash plus marketable securities over net assets, i.e. total assets less 
cash and marketable securities. The underlying reason is that a company’s ability to 
generate future profit streams is dependent on its net assets in place. Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004), on the other hand, only use the ratio of total cash and equivalent items 
to total assets. To capture potential differences in this thesis, both measures are used 
separately and empirical results are compared. This approach can be compared to the 
one used by Garcia-Tereul et al. (2008).  
Growth opportunities are measured differently in previous studies, depending to a 
great extent on data availability. For their study on Spanish SMEs, Garcia-Tereul et 
al. (2007) use the ratio  as a proxy for growth. However, if more data is 
available, the market-to-book ratio is a commonly used measure of growth 
opportunities (Chen & Zhao, 2006). Hence, this measure also finds application in this 
thesis. As discussed in Chapter 2, the expected correlation of growth and cash 
holdings is positive according to the transaction costs model. However, the financing 
hierarchy model predicts a negative correlation due to the primary use of internal 
financial resources (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, & Servaes, 2003). Hence, our expectations 
of the sign of the coefficient are ambiguous. 
To take into account the firm size, the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets is 
used. Although Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and Opler et al. (1999) measure total assets 
in real terms, nominal values are used in this study, which is in line with Garcia-
Tereul et al. (2008) as well as Ben and Yuanjian (2007). As already discussed, larger 
firms tend to hold relatively less cash due to potential economies of scale in cash 
management, smaller information asymmetries, and fewer agency problems. Thus, the 
expected impact of firm size is negative. 
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When it comes to measuring the likelihood of financial distress, there is a greater 
variety of proxies used in the scientific literature. Opler et al. (1999) use R&D 
expenditures to sales as a proxy since they argue that firms with a higher R&D ratio 
tend to be riskier due to uncertainty in the R&D process. Garcia-Tereul et al. (2008) 
use a re-estimated Z-Score model originally developed by Altman (1968); Kim et al. 
(1998) use the inverse of Altman’s original Z-Score. Moreover, there is also 
controversy regarding the direction of the impact. Whereas Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) 
and Ferreira and Vilela (2004) expect a positive correlation based on the transaction 
costs model, Kim et al. (1998) expect firms with a greater likelihood of financial 
distress to have lower levels of liquidity due to the underinvestment problem (Myers, 
1977). In this thesis, the original Z-Score model is used to estimate the likelihood of 
financial distress. However, in contrast to Altman’s original model this study uses the 
book value of total liabilities as proxy for debt and not the book value of total debt. 
This choice is consistent with Altman’s (2000) model. However, the expected 
correlation with cash holdings is ambiguous (Altman, 2000). 
 
where  X1 = Working capital / Total assets 
  X2 = Retained earnings / Total assets 
  X3 = EBIT / Total assets 
  X4 = Market value of equity / Book value of total liabilities 
  X5 = Sales / Total assets 
When it comes to leverage, empirical studies deliver more consistent findings in line 
with theoretical implications, namely a negative correlation between leverage and 
cash holdings. Although different studies use slightly different proxies for leverage, 
total liabilities over total assets is a common measure and is therefore used as a 
measure of leverage in this thesis, too. 
As previously discussed, Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008) argue that a 
firm’s debt maturity structure can have significant impact on cash holdings. In this 
thesis, the ratio of short-term debt and current portion of long-term debt over total 
debt is used. Firms that use more long-term debt i.e. have a lower debt maturity ratio, 
face less variety in refinancing costs and also less information asymmetry. Hence, 
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theory implies a positive correlation between the ratio used and the level of cash 
holdings. 
As presented, a firm’s cash holdings can be seen as accumulated historical cash flow. 
If moderate cash flow volatility is assumed, high present cash flow is an indicator of 
relatively high cash holdings, thus there is a positive expected correlation. Also, as 
interpreted by Dittmar et al. (2003), a positive correlation indicates support for the 
financing hierarchy as firms then accumulate cash. However, if cash flows are 
regarded as a source of financing future investments, one can argue that stable cash 
flows reduce the need of cash holdings, thus indicating a negative relationship. Opler 
et al. (1999) use earnings after interest, dividends, taxes plus depreciation over net 
assets as cash flow proxy. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) use pre-tax profits plus 
depreciation over total assets as a measure of cash flow. Since the variables chosen 
for this thesis also include dividends, it is appropriate to compute cash flow as pre-tax 
profits plus depreciation minus dividends over total assets.  
Beyond cash flow measures, other non-cash liquid assets can determine firms’ cash 
holdings. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008) 
use the net working capital to assets as a proxy for liquid asset substitutes that can be 
easily and relatively cost-efficient when transferred into cash holdings. In line with 
these previous studies the same proxy for liquidity is used and according to the 
transaction cost theory’s substitution effect a negative relation can be expected. 
Another variable that may affect the cash level is the amount a firm pays as dividends. 
Cash holdings can be connected with agency problems, as argued by Jensen (1986), 
i.e. that an overinvestment problem may arise. One way to mitigate this problem is to 
pay dividends. Thus, to the extent that firms are exposed to the overinvestment 
problem, cash holdings should be negatively related to dividends. Moreover, Ozkan 
and Ozkan (2004) argue that dividends can be viewed as negative equity and to the 
extent a firm can raise funds by cutting dividends there should be a negative 
relationship between cash and dividends. The authors also put forward the possibility 
that a dividend paying firm can allow themselves to have higher cash levels relative to 
a non-dividend paying firm in order to avoid a situation where the cash level is not 
high enough to support dividend payments. In this case, there will be a positive 
relationship between dividends and cash holdings. Opler et al. (1999) include a 
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dummy variable for dividend payments while Ozkan and Ozkan define the same 
variable as dividend payments over total assets. It can be argued that defining the 
variable as an actual number will add precision to the empirical model and thus, the 
dividend variable is defined in the same manner as in Ozkan and Ozkan (2004).  
The relative attractiveness of investing in production versus investing in liquid assets 
may have an effect on cash holdings. Kim et al. (1998) show that investments in cash 
holdings are negatively related to the current return on assets and positively related to 
the return on cash, i.e. a risk-free rate. In accordance with Kim et al. (1998) and 
Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008) the opportunity cost of capital is measured 
as the difference between the return on assets and the return on short-term Treasury 
bills. This negative relation clearly confirms the trade-off theory where the 
opportunity cost is equivalent to the marginal costs of cash holdings.  
 
Figure 4: Description of Variables 
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4. Methodology 
4.1 Panel Data 
In order to test the impact of the possible cash determinants on the level of cash 
holdings, the least squares method is employed on panel data. Panel data sets contain 
a number of cross-sectional observations collected over time. As such they contain 
both time and cross-section effects and consequently the data sets are typically larger 
than for pure cross-section or time-series data sets. Because of the larger sample size 
and the fact that explanatory variables vary over two dimensions, the estimators based 
on panel data are generally more accurate than for other sources. Even if sample sizes 
are identical, parameter estimators tend to be more efficient. The standard form of a 
panel data model can be described as 
 
where  is the dependent variable,  is the intercept term,  is a  vector of 
parameters to be estimated on the independent variables using the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method, and  is a  vector of observations on the independent 
variables with  (Brooks, 2008). 
Firstly, panel data may ease the problem of distinguishing true state dependence from 
spurious state dependence. Spurious state dependence assumes that unobserved 
characteristics of individuals may influence the probability of individuals being 
dependent on a parameter when they in fact are not affected by the parameter. 
Employing panel data will reduce this problem by taking individual characteristics 
into account and thereby allow for easier identification of individual dynamics, i.e. 
identification of true state dependence. Secondly, panel data can reduce the effects of 
omitted variables. Omitted variable bias arises when a variable that is correlated with 
the included variables is excluded from the model. Furthermore, to get the equivalent 
explanatory power using pure time series models generally would require an 
extensive range of observation periods to obtain a sufficient number of observations 
for meaningful hypothesis testing. On the contrary, panel data combines both time 
and cross-sectional dimensions simultaneously (Brooks, 2008; Campbell, Lo, & 
MacKinlay, 1997).  
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When it comes to the data sample and importing it into any statistics software4, a first 
distinction must be drawn between balanced panel data and unbalanced panel data. 
A balanced panel has a constant number of time-series observations for each cross-
sectional unit whereas unbalanced data exhibits different amounts of observations at 
different points of time. Since only cross-sectional units with at least five consecutive 
observations are used in this data sample and most of the statistics programs balance 
missing data automatically, the data set in this study can be seen as balanced.  
Fixed effects, sometimes also referred to as least squares dummy variable model, can 
be included to capture the effect of all observable and unobservable variables that do 
not vary over individual units. As such, panel data estimators may be more robust to 
an incomplete model specification. Finally, endogeneity problems, i.e. if regressors 
are correlated with the error terms, may be mitigated using a panel data specification. 
More specifically, applying a fixed effects assumption removes the part of the error 
term that is correlated with the regressors and thus allows for heterogeneity (Verbeek, 
2004). Due to the nature of panel data, fixed effect models are of either cross-
sectional or time-series nature. Cross-sectional fixed effects decompose the error 
term, , into an individual specific effect, , and a new error term, , that again 
varies over time and entities (Brooks, 2008). 
 
Time-series fixed effects are used when it can be assumed that the average value of 
the dependent variable, , changes over time. A time-series fixed effect model is 
defined as 
 
where  is a time-varying intercept that captures effects influencing the dependent 
variable over time but are constant for all entities. Both fixed-effects can also be 
combined if necessary (Brooks, 2008). Both models can be tested for significance 
using a joint F-test of the fixed effects, i.e. a redundancy test of fixed effects.  
4.2 Using a Static Linear Panel Data Model 
The used model is a static linear OLS model and, in this study, has cross-sectional 
fixed effects in which the intercept varies over the individual units i: 
                                                
4 EViews 6.0 is used in this thesis 
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where the error terms are distributed  
 
This approach considers the distribution of the dependent variable given αi, which 
allows for αi to be estimated (Verbeek, 2004). For the two data samples, the 
redundancy tests for each fixed-effects model show that the null hypothesis of 
redundant time-fixed effects cannot be rejected, i.e. the average value of the 
dependent variable does not change over time. When the corresponding tests for 
cross-section fixed effects are performed the null hypothesis is rejected, i.e. entities 
show individual effects that do not vary over time. Hence, the two samples, Germany 
and Sweden, require the use of a cross-section fixed effects model. This specification 
means that the intercept is allowed to vary among entities but not over time.5 
However, even if problems with heteroskedasticity are mitigated with fixed effects, 
autocorrelation remains a potential source of problems. For this reason, a generalized 
Durbin-Watson test for first-order autocorrelation in the residuals of panel data was 
developed by Bhargava et al. in 1982. Bhargava et al. (1982) argue that with an 
increasing number of entities similar tests, e.g. the Berenblut-Webb test, become 
equivalent and thus in practice only the Durbin-Watson test needs to be applied. The 
researchers also provide tables with related test statistics that are used to test the 
Durbin-Watson results for significant autocorrelation since the confidence intervals 
depend on the length of the balanced panel, the number of regressors, and the number 
of entities. For both samples the Durbin-Watson test statistic cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that there are no problems with autocorrelation. Since cross-sectional fixed 
effects estimators are employed, a possible time-invariant component in αi that is 
correlated with the explanatory variables is already removed (Verbeek, 2004). 
Moreover, White’s correction of the standard errors, which is robust to serial 
correlation and time-varying differences in disturbances, is used. This will allow for 
correct inferences even though autocorrelation remains.  
                                                
5 See Appendix for redundancy test results 
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Another test for robustness is the fact that two regressions on the same data sample 
are run, using both the Cash1 and Cash2 variable. This approach is based on the study 
of Spanish SMEs by Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008). Both regressions 
deliver consistent results. Furthermore, regressions of first differences on both 
dependent variables and on both data sets are run.6 For the first differences 
regressions the Durbin-Watson test statistic indicates no problems with 
autocorrelation and thus the results are used to compare and validate the previously 
autocorrelated regressions (Bhargava, Franzini, & Narendranathan, 1982). 
                                                
6 First differences on all variables are used. Since many variables have negative ratios using first 
differences is an appropriate substitute for taking the natural logarithm 
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In order to get a first impression about the data sample and to characterize the firms of 
the sample, descriptive statistics are an important first step to present and analyze the 
data sample as well as to pinpoint possible differences between Swedish and German 
firms. This section starts with presenting and discussing the correlation matrix of both 
data panels and continues with a more qualitative approach by presenting the time-
varying means of the variables in graphical form. Moreover, the mean-difference test, 
i.e. t-test, is used to test for statistically significant differences between the two 
economies (Thomas, 2005). 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used as well as the results 
from the mean-difference test. The sample comprises all complete observations from 
2000 and 2001. It can be seen that Swedish corporate cash holding ratios are generally 
higher than German equivalents, regardless of the variable used, i.e. Cash1 or Cash2. 
However, Cash2 ratios are not significantly different from each other. Since Size is 
measured in Euro and Swedish kronor, direct implications on the distribution of firm 
size cannot be drawn. However, when using an average exchange rate of 9.2974 
EUR/SEK7 the average sizes of German and Swedish firms are EUR 251mn and EUR 
191mn, respectively. This can be explained by the larger German economy in general 
and the higher amount of German-based multinational companies in particular. 
                                                
7 Source: Thomson Datastream, average historical exchange rate EUR/SEK from 2000 until 2008 
25% Q MEAN MEDIAN 75% Q Std Dev. 25% Q MEAN MEDIAN 75% Q Std. Dev.
Cash1 0.028 0.117 0.070 0.156 0.128 * 0.039 0.127 0.081 0.165 0.129
Cash2 0.029 0.170 0.075 0.185 0.285 0.041 0.184 0.088 0.198 0.281
Growth 1.013 2.268 1.630 2.600 2.770 *** 1.310 2.677 1.990 3.260 2.285
Size 11.061 12.433 12.077 13.514 2.110 *** 12.870 14.390 14.194 15.805 2.127
ZScore 1.590 2.800 2.397 3.472 2.386 *** 1.817 3.344 2.778 3.993 3.090
Leverage 0.483 0.605 0.617 0.734 0.195 *** 0.426 0.548 0.574 0.676 0.169
DebtMaturity 0.034 0.155 0.108 0.232 0.155 *** 0.015 0.110 0.076 0.181 0.112
CashFlow 0.029 0.057 0.073 0.115 0.113 *** 0.013 0.039 0.066 0.111 0.129
Liquidity -0.049 0.068 0.070 0.190 0.187 -0.027 0.069 0.060 0.174 0.145
Dividend 0.000 0.014 0.006 0.018 0.036 *** 0.000 0.021 0.013 0.027 0.031
OppCost 0.001 0.025 0.040 0.080 0.114 *** -0.029 -0.003 0.034 0.090 0.188
Observations 2,458 825
* = mean-difference significant at 10% level, *** at 1% level
GERMANY SWEDEN
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
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Swedish companies indicate significantly higher Market-to-Book ratios, which are 
used as proxy for growth opportunities. Moreover, Swedish firms exhibit a 
significantly lower gearing, i.e. Leverage, and a higher credit quality, measured as 
ZScore. These findings are in line with the discussion of leverage of Swedish and 
German companies in chapter 2.5. The Liquidity variable and the OppCost variable 
are not clearly different in all quartiles between the countries, whereas the latter 
exhibits a higher spread for Swedish firms and vice versa. For Swedish companies, 
the average opportunity costs are even slightly negative. When it comes to CashFlow, 
German companies exhibit significantly higher cash flow ratios than their Swedish 
counterparts. 
Table 2, provided at the end of this chapter, presents the means of the explanatory 
variables over time and highlights peaks and lows in the respective years. It can be 
seen that the means vary significantly over time and show a different development 
across the countries. In the following, selected variables are explained in depth 
whereas the remaining graphs can be found in the appendix. 
 
Figure 5: Swedish and German Cash Holdings Means over Time 
Figure 5 presents the evolution over time of the different cash ratios of the firms 
analysed.8 It can be seen that the development of Swedish and German cash holdings 
is distinct from each other. Whereas German cash holdings reached their peak in 2005 
and 2008 with a Cash to Total Assets (Cash1) ratio of 12%, Swedish companies held 
the highest level of cash in 2003 at a 14.7% level with stagnating ratios ever since. In 
                                                
8 Time period starts here in 2001 since the data sample with first difference variables (i.e. excluding the 
first year) is used 
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2007, Swedish cash levels were for the first time below cash levels of German firms. 
This trend also persisted in 2008. Due to the nature of the two measures for cash 
levels, the gap between the two ratios also decreased with decreasing absolute cash 
holdings, which can be seen in the latter years of Swedish firms. 
Figure 6 shows the development of the firms’ probability of financial distress, 
measured as average Altman’s Z-Score, and average financial leverage. Although 
German firms exhibit generally lower Z-Scores, i.e. show a higher probability of 
financial distress, the development of the German score is less volatile. Whereas Z-
Scores of Swedish companies peak in 2006 at an average score of 3.99 (Germany: 
2.81), the Swedish scores are for the first time lower than their German counterparts 
in 2008. A similar development can be observed in financial leverage. Here, financial 
gearing of Swedish firms exceeds German leverage for the first time in 2008 and 
simultaneously reaches the maximum observed in the data sample. The graphical 
presentation of the different developments of the remaining variables over time can be 
found in the appendix. Other variables show similar developments. Hence, it can be 
said that German and Swedish companies exhibit distinct characteristics and that 
these characteristics also vary differently over time. This leads to the next section of 
this chapter, where the different variables are analyzed in a regression analysis using 
panel data.  
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Figure 6: ZScore and Leverage Means of Swedish and German Companies over Time 
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5.2 Panel Data Study 
Table 3 presents the results of the panel data regressions on both dependent variables 
and also on the first differences. Furthermore, regression coefficients in the form of 
 and adjusted  are given as well as significance levels for all explanatory 
variables. Moreover, the Durbin-Watson test statistic is given for each regression to 
analyze potential autocorrelation problems. The results of the analysis indicate mostly 
favourable  and adjusted  values, even when we control for autocorrelation. 
Furthermore, coefficients of the first differences regressions are generally consistent 
with the original data regressions, indicating robust results. However, the results of 
the regression of first differences on the Cash2 variable using German data differ 
from the rest with an insignificant F-statistic and low regression coefficients. Hence, 
results of this single regression should be treated with care when it comes to 
analyzing the impact of each determinant on cash holdings. 
Growth 
The measure for growth opportunities, i.e. market-to-book ratio, has mostly negative 
coefficients, thus implying that firms with an abundance of investment opportunities 
face higher costs of holding liquid assets due to forgone opportunities. This result 
would support the financing hierarchy model rather than the transaction cost theory 
Variable Means 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
GER Cash1 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12
GER Cash2 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16
GER Growth 2.28 2.13 1.43 1.94 1.80 2.14 2.49 2.24
GER Size 12.62 12.22 12.21 12.14 12.24 12.27 12.39 13.82
GER ZScore 2.64 2.40 2.21 2.67 2.58 2.80 2.85 2.97
GER Leverage 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.60 0.60 0.58 0.59 0.58
GER DebtMaturity 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.13
GER CashFlow 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07
GER Liquidity 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07
GER Dividend 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
GER OppCost 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.07
SWE Cash1 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.08
SWE Cash2 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.10
SWE Growth 2.76 2.70 1.64 2.42 2.35 2.90 2.96 2.18
SWE Size 15.01 14.33 13.87 14.08 14.30 14.29 14.61 15.71
SWE ZScore 3.53 2.79 2.30 3.25 3.22 3.99 3.57 2.89
SWE Leverage 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.54 0.60
SWE DebtMaturity 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12
SWE CashFlow 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05
SWE Liquidity 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06
SWE Dividend 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
SWE OppCost -0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03
G
E
R
M
A
N
Y
S
W
E
D
E
N
Table 2: Variable Means over Time 
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where cash holdings have a higher marginal benefit for firms with high growth 
opportunities. However, none but one of the coefficients are significant, indicating a 
low impact of growth opportunities on cash holdings. Furthermore, since results are 
homogenous across the two countries, no impact of corporate governance on this 
variable can be found. 
Size 
The coefficients of the size variable show ambiguous results. For the original data 
sample and Cash1 regressions the coefficients are significant and negative, which is 
in line with the transaction cost model and previous research of Opler et al. (1999), 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), as well as Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008), 
indicating scale economies of cash holdings according to the transaction cost model. 
The negative correlation also implies that it is relatively easier and cheaper for larger 
companies with good track records to raise external funds when needed. However, for 
regressions of Swedish companies on the Cash2 variable significantly positive 
relations are found. This would instead support the financing hierarchy model where 
larger companies are assumed to have been more successful in the past and therefore 
have accumulated relatively more cash than smaller firms. This could also be 
interpreted as a sign of stronger agency problems between managers and 
shareholders, potentially due to empire building. This result is not supported by the 
notion of stronger shareholder protection that prevails in Sweden as presented earlier. 
However, as the empirical results on the size coefficient are contradictory in signs and 
insignificant in many cases, no definite conclusion on the effect of size can be drawn. 
Z-Score 
The transaction cost model implies that firms with a higher credit rating, i.e. higher Z-
Score, hold less cash whereas the financing hierarchy theory implies the opposite, 
since high-quality firms have less debt and, ceteris paribus, a higher credit rating. The 
empirical results of the regressions support this theory with all but one coefficient 
being positive. However, only significant coefficients are found for Cash1 regressions 
on the German data sample. Since this result is robust as shown by the first-
differences regression, it can be argued that credit quality has a stronger impact on 
cash holdings for German firms. This is of particular interest since German companies 
generally have lower Z-Scores as shown in the previous section. Thus, it can be 
argued that the impact of a credit rating on cash holdings becomes stronger with 
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lower ratings. From a corporate governance perspective it can be said that in a country 
with lower creditor protection a firm’s average credit quality increases and, at the 
same time, leverage decreases to satisfy creditors’ requirements. A lower leverage 
also decreases the need of covenants or other restrictions, thus having less impact on a 
firm’s liquid asset holdings. Hence, the results for the Swedish sample are consistent 
with the transaction cost model and the findings that Swedish companies face lower 
creditor protection. 
Leverage 
As shown earlier, high debt levels can increase the probability of financial distress 
and therefore should be positively correlated with cash if the precautionary motive 
holds. However, leverage is found to be negatively related to cash holdings as was 
expected according to the trade-off theory with respect to the substitution effect. This 
result is also consistent with many previous studies and suggests that adding debt to a 
firm’s capital structure reduces financial slack associated with agency problems. 
Moreover, nearly all regressions indicate a significant impact, thus showing that 
leverage has a strong influence on a firm’s cash holdings in both countries. This 
indicates that firms can use borrowing as a substitute for holding cash (Ozkan & 
Ozkan, 2004).  
Debt Maturity 
The debt maturity coefficient delivers very consistent and significant results. In all 
regressions that were conducted, debt maturity has a significantly negative impact on 
corporate cash holdings, which contradicts the expected outcome. Hence, a higher 
variety in refinancing costs of short-term debt does not increase a firm’s cash 
holdings. It can more accurately be argued that firms use short-term debt rather than 
long-term debt as a substitute for cash, thus the findings are consistent with the 
discussion of leverage above, even though it was not expected. Moreover, since the 
findings are consistent with the empirical results for the leverage variable for both 
countries, no significant differences in corporate governance effects can be 
pinpointed. 
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Dependent variable: Cash1 Cash2 Cash1 Cash2 Cash1 Cash2 Cash1 Cash2
Independent variables:
Growth -0.0006 -0.0078 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0039 -0.0001 -0.0002*
(0.0005) (0.0049) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0049) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Size -0.0272*** 0.1371* -0.0214*** -0.0186 0.0421 1.3187*** -0.0093 0.0566
(0.0077) (0.0823) (0.0053) (0.0201) (0.0286) (0.5312) (0.0084) (0.0533)
ZScore 0.0007 -0.0029 0.0013*** 0.0006 0.0007 0.0439 0.0008* 0.0011
(0.0009) (0.0176) (0.0003) (0.0018) (0.0007) (0.0299) (0.0004) (0.0012)
Leverage -0.3191*** -0.1490 -0.2065*** -0.5185*** -0.3753*** -0.7694 -0.2049*** -0.4288***
(0.0386) (0.1504) (0.0169) (0.0431) (0.0589) (0.4745) (0.0233) (0.1095)
DebtMaturity -0.1890*** -0.7466*** -0.1291*** -0.4659*** -0.2111*** -1.0362*** -0.1232*** -0.2967***
(0.0243) (0.2072) (0.0150) (0.1573) (0.0192) (0.3945) (0.0122) (0.0466)
CashFlow 0.0709*** 3.9008*** 0.0093 -0.7955 0.0022 3.0689*** 0.0285 -0.5777**
(0.0169) (0.5851) (0.0369) (0.5196) (0.0507) (0.9398) (0.0269) (0.2454)
Liquidity -0.3663*** -1.1566*** -0.2277*** -0.6292*** -0.4163*** -1.0303*** -0.2620*** -0.7668***
(0.0326) (0.2867) (0.0182) (0.0746) (0.0623) (0.3729) (0.0177) (0.0455)
Dividend 0.1082 3.2453*** 0.0072 -0.7993 -0.0889 3.3868*** 0.0249 -0.5949**
(0.0739) (0.4708) (0.0379) (0.5179) (0.1132) (1.4504) (0.0300) (0.2503)
OppCost -0.0671*** -2.0787*** 0.0254 0.7777* -0.0302*** -1.6007*** 0.0187 0.6746***
(0.0134) (0.2337) (0.0249) (0.4398) (0.0124) (0.4429) (0.0137) (0.2205)
Intercept 0.7515*** -1.6422 0.5379*** 0.8826*** -0.0073*** -0.1339*** -0.0006 -0.0115
(0.1088) (1.1804) (0.0699) (0.2375) (0.0027) (0.0591) (0.0022) (0.0094)
R2 0.8870 0.7705 0.7916 0.7198 0.2761 0.2866 0.2751 0.1426
Adj. R2 0.8656 0.7271 0.7562 0.6721 0.1078 0.1206 0.1272 -0.0324
DW-statistic 1.6072 2.3674 1.3298 1.6309 2.8645 2.6148 2.7562 3.0083
F-statistic 41.4693 17.7387 22.3322 15.1017 1.6398 1.7266 1.8596 0.8150
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.9881
Number of observations 780 780 2154 2154 658 658 1848 1848
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
Original data First differences data
SWEDEN GERMANY SWEDEN GERMANY
Table 3: Regression Results of Fixed-Effects Static Panel Data Model (OLS) 
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Cash flow 
For the Swedish sample all coefficients estimated show positive signs. Only the 
coefficient in the model estimated using first differences where Cash1 is used as 
dependent variable is not significant. The remaining coefficients are significant at the 
1%-level of significance. These results are consistent with the financing hierarchy 
model suggesting that firms with high cash flows pay off debt, pay dividends and 
accumulate cash. Furthermore, this can be interpreted as firms taking precautionary 
actions against future cash shortfalls or the costs that would be faced if external 
capital would have to be raised in order to meet future investment needs. In contrast 
to these results, the sign of CashFlow in the Cash2 regressions of German data using 
both original data and first differences data is negative. The coefficient in the latter 
specification is significant at the 5%-level of significance. This suggests that, in line 
with the interpretation of Dittmar et al. (2003) regarding the trade-off theory’s 
prediction, if cash flows are high, firms do not need to hold high levels of cash in 
order to meet future investment needs. Thus, provided all else is equal, the marginal 
cost outweighs the marginal benefit of holding cash. However, as mentioned above, 
the results from this regression may have to be treated with care; hence drawing a 
more conservative conclusion regarding this particular variable with this specification 
would be preferable. The fact that positive and significant variables are found for the 
Swedish sample may be indicative of the lower degree of creditor protection.  
Liquidity 
As mentioned in chapter 3.2, the variable Liquidity is a proxy for other non-cash 
liquid assets that can easily and cost-effectively be transferred into cash holdings. The 
coefficient in all specifications for both samples is negative and significant at the 1%-
level of significant, suggesting a substitution effect between cash and other liquid 
assets. This result is consistent with the results of, among others, Opler et al. (1999) 
and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and also in line with the expected outcome according to 
the trade-off theory. 
Dividend 
The variable Dividend measures dividend payments to total assets. The coefficient is 
positive and significant at the 1% level for the Swedish sample with Cash2 as the 
dependent variable in both the specification with original data and first differences 
data. This suggests that, in line with one of the arguments by Ozkan and Ozkan 
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(2004), firms have higher cash levels in order to avoid a situation where dividend 
payments might not be supported. Thus, a precautionary motive for cash holdings 
may be apparent for Swedish firms. The coefficient for the variable Dividend in the 
German sample is negative and significant the 5% level in the model specification 
with first differences data and Cash2 and dependent variable. This result supports the 
argument that German firms pay dividends in order to mitigate overinvestment 
problems. Thus, these firms do not have high levels of cash holdings. This may also 
imply, as put forward in chapter 3.2, that firms indirectly raise external capital by 
cutting dividends, i.e. dividends are not as “sticky” as in Sweden. Again, the 
differences in this determinant between Swedish and German firms may be explained 
by the different degrees of investor protection and consequently the development of 
the respective capital markets. It seems that Swedish firms take precautionary actions 
in an attempt to avoid having to cut dividends, possibly indicating a stronger focus on 
pleasing shareholders, which is a consequence of the stronger shareholder rights. 
German firms might cut dividends to finance investments which might be one way to 
mitigate some of the higher costs of equity associated with raising capital in a market 
where shareholder protection is weaker. On the other hand, paying dividends and 
therefore mitigating possible overinvestment problems may already be a way to lower 
the cost of equity. 
Opportunity cost 
For the Swedish sample the coefficient of the variable OppCost shows a negative sign 
and is significant at the 1%-level in all model specifications. Kim et al. (1998) argue 
that the marginal benefit of holding cash decreases as the return on alternative 
investments increases. As the results show, this would imply a negative relationship 
between opportunity cost and cash holdings. However, for German firms the 
coefficient shows a positive sign in all model specifications and is significant on the 
10% and 1% level in both models with Cash2 as the dependent variable. This may be 
explained by the fact that the variable is defined as the return on assets less cash and 
equivalents subtracted by the short-term interest rate, thus capturing the profitability 
of firms. In addition this variable is not based on forward-looking data, which may 
add weight to the latter interpretation. If this interpretation was applied to explain the 
sign of the variable, the conclusion would be that, in accordance to the financing 
hierarchy model, firms that are profitable accumulate cash. The lower shareholder 
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protection in Germany brings explanatory power to this result in the sense that firms 
may have easier access to debt financing, thereby decreasing the cost of holding 
excess cash. Moreover, the corporate environment in Germany may be less oriented 
towards shareholders. 
As can be seen in Figure 7, the two 
countries show similar features in 
the variables Growth, Leverage, 
DebtMaturity, and Liquidity. 
Significant and opposite signs are 
found in the opportunity cost 
variable. The different levels of 
shareholder and creditor protection 
in both countries may explain these 
differences. Thus, it can be concluded that national corporate governance frameworks 
do have a possible impact on companies’ levels of cash holdings. Furthermore, there 
is no single theory that satisfactorily explains the impact of these determinants, 
implying that these theories may not be mutually exclusive or exhaustive.  
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Figure 7: Expected and Actual Signs of Coefficients 
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6. Conclusions 
6.1 Summary 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the determinants of cash holdings of companies 
with their home market in either Sweden or Germany. Furthermore, differences in the 
behaviour of explanatory variables between Swedish and German companies can 
possibly be explained by the differences in investor protection for the two countries. 
The purpose is achieved by describing key features of the data collected and running 
four different specifications of panel least squares regressions for Swedish and 
German companies separately, with cash holdings as dependent variable. 
Swedish companies are found to have higher cash levels on average when measured 
as cash and cash equivalents over total assets. Also, leverage and the relative amount 
of short-term debt to total assets are found to be significantly higher for German 
firms. This supports previous studies’ findings, which conclude that Germany 
generally has a more credit friendly environment and that German companies tend to 
have stronger banking relationships. Moreover, it is found that Swedish firms have a 
higher level of dividend payments to total assets, which may be explained by the 
better shareholder protection in Sweden.  
The results from the panel data regressions are supportive of both the trade-off and 
financing hierarchy model with interesting differences between Swedish and German 
firms among the coefficients. However, the authors are aware that the results 
presented may have to be interpreted with caution since not all are robust to the 
different model specifications. The results for the impact of firm size on cash holdings 
are inconclusive as the coefficient shows different signs depending on the different 
model specifications. There is a negative impact of short-term debt, the DebtMaturity 
variable, and leverage on cash holdings for both samples which is consistent with the 
previously documented substitution effect on cash and the usage of leverage to reduce 
agency costs. The negative impact of liquid assets on cash holdings, which is 
consistent for both samples and all model specifications, adds weight to the 
substitution mechanism as a determinant. When it comes to determining differences 
between Swedish and German firms in the explanatory variables, some distinctions 
can be made regarding the prevalence of either theory. Cash flow to total assets is 
positively related to cash holdings for Swedish firms, suggesting support for the 
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financing hierarchy model and possibly a precautionary motive. The results for the 
German sample are less robust and thus rather ambiguous. The results may be 
explained by the weaker creditor protection present in Sweden, which consequently 
leads to firms being more dependent on internally generated funds. The weaker 
creditor protection in Sweden may also explain the results of the relationship between 
credit quality and cash holdings. It is argued that Swedish firms have higher credit 
quality on average as a consequence of more expensive external finance. For the 
Swedish sample, dividend payments are found to be positively related to cash 
holdings while the opposite is found to be true for German firms. Again this may 
indicate support for a precautionary motive among Swedish firms. Moreover, the 
possible prevalence of a precautionary motive for dividend payment among Swedish 
firms may be the result of stronger shareholder protection and shareholder orientation 
as suspected by the findings from the descriptive statistics. Opportunity costs of cash 
holdings have positive signs for German firms while Swedish firms experience a 
decrease in cash holdings as return on capital increases implying additional evidence 
on the significance of corporate governance effects on cash holdings.  
6.2 Suggestions for Future Research 
This study shows that market conditions and investor protection affect cash holdings 
and its determinants in an ambiguous fashion. It is also shown that there is no 
prevailing theory that causes companies to hold more, or less, cash and that corporate 
cash holdings significantly vary across countries. Cross-country studies including 
corporate governance variables as well as firm-specific variables are still scarce, 
especially for European economies. Thus, extending a similar approach, using panel 
data models, to other European markets where different market conditions may be 
more distinctive can provide additional insights to the mechanisms that determine 
firms’ cash holdings. Additionally, firm-specific corporate governance variables, e.g. 
ownership structure, board structure, and management compensation, are not included 
in this study. An inclusion of these factors can provide a framework for a more 
thorough analysis of cash holdings. Finally, this study’s results are not particularly 
robust to different model specifications, which may imply that a different estimation 
method than least squares might be more suitable in order to analyse panel data more 
accurately. The application of non-linear estimation techniques using a generalized 
method of moments approach (GMM) could be of particular pertinence. This could 
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prove to be useful in increasing robustness while simultaneously avoiding 
autocorrelation problems.  
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Appendix 
 
Correlation Matrix: 
 
 
Cash1 Cash2 Growth Size ZScore Leverage DebtMaturity CashFlow Liquidity Dividend OppCost
Cash1  1.0000
Cash2  0.6349  1.0000
Growth  0.1479  0.0422  1.0000
Size -0.3691 -0.1791 -0.0329  1.0000
ZScore  0.4781  0.3345  0.2093 -0.1549  1.0000
Leverage -0.6318 -0.3605 -0.0797  0.3426 -0.4526  1.0000
DebtMaturity -0.3532 -0.1565 -0.0910  0.1245 -0.2062  0.2844  1.0000
CashFlow -0.3192 -0.2196 -0.0046  0.3295  0.0345  0.0837  0.0612  1.0000
Liquidity -0.1159 -0.0904  0.0512  0.0141  0.0868 -0.2148 -0.2230  0.2172  1.0000
Dividend  0.0042 -0.0611  0.1105  0.2108  0.1622 -0.1241 -0.0797  0.2422  0.1927  1.0000
OppCost -0.5054 -0.7014 -0.0179  0.2606 -0.1155  0.2267  0.0968  0.7083  0.1577  0.2415  1.0000
Cash1 Cash2 Growth Size ZScore Leverage DebtMaturity CashFlow Liquidity Dividend OppCost
Cash1  1.0000
Cash2  0.7437  1.0000
Growth  0.0238  0.0102  1.0000
Size -0.2328 -0.1811 -0.0109  1.0000
ZScore  0.1469  0.0699  0.0122 -0.0293  1.0000
Leverage -0.4175 -0.2796  0.0008  0.2046 -0.3221  1.0000
DebtMaturity -0.2301 -0.0873  0.0019 -0.0745 -0.0966  0.2253  1.0000
CashFlow  0.0005 -0.0085  0.0049  0.1031  0.0808 -0.0891 -0.0909  1.0000
Liquidity -0.1607 -0.1184 -0.0211  0.0514  0.0874 -0.3785 -0.2215  0.1570  1.0000
Dividend -0.0014  0.0041  0.0052 -0.0319  0.0078 -0.0182  0.0521 -0.4711 -0.0365  1.0000
OppCost  0.0106  0.0579  0.0208  0.1365  0.1967 -0.1768 -0.0663  0.4272  0.2113  0.0157  1.0000
SWEDEN
GERMANY
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Descriptive Statistics: 
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Redundancy Tests for Fixed Effects: 
 
 
Weighted average 
sample variance
Test Statistic P-Value
Cash1 0.016 -1.947 0.052
Cash2 0.081 -1.228 0.220
Growth 7.059 -3.821 0.000
Size 4.469 -22.998 0.000
ZScore 6.661 -5.236 0.000
Leverage 0.036 7.564 0.000
DebtMaturity 0.021 7.609 0.000
CashFlow 0.014 3.852 0.000
Liquidity 0.032 -0.111 0.912
Dividend 0.001 -5.000 0.000
OppCost 0.019 5.154 0.000
Degrees of Freedom: 3,281
Mean-difference tests
Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob.
Cross-section F 11.5060 0.0000 12.8911 0.0000
Cross-section Chi-square 862.1377 0.0000 2457.6725 0.0000
Period F 1.5543 0.1458 1.0233 0.4124
Period Chi-square 11.0442 0.1367 7.2083 0.4075
GERMANYSWEDEN
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